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Abstract
The pervasiveness of flash based USB storage alongside increasing capacity and lowering price points has lead
to a documented potential for information leakage. Such a potential is significantly raised when employees are
able to use personal devices within a business environment with little regard to safe disposal practices. This study
purchased a range of USB storage devices from UK based auction sites to determine what if any data was
recoverable. The study found a total of 36136 recoverable files including a range of data detailing private
information of previous owners, confidential corporate data, with twenty percent of the purchased USB devices
securely wiped before sale.
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INTRODUCTION
The United Kingdom has a widely documented history of information leakage due to either the loss of or
improper disposal of hardware (Kennedy, 2008; Oates, 2008; BBC, 2008; BBC, 2009). With the broad range of
well publicised incidents alongside freely available secure erasure tools it may be expected that there should be a
reduction in the phenomenon. Therefore the purpose of this research was to investigate a random sample of the
second hand portable storage market and quantify whether the increased awareness has lead to any real
improvement.

THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM
One of the earlier and more influential studies into this area was conducted by Jones (2005) on the disposal of
corporate hard disks. It was found that only 16% of the imaged disks were completely erased, with a further 48%
showing signs of superficial data removal. Even with such attempts 51% of the imaged disks contained personal
information, 20% financial information, 8% network information and 4% contained illicit material.
This research was expanded in 2006 in a joint study (Jones, 2006). In this attempt 42% were found to be totally
blank, 28% contained commercial data and a further 29% individual data. This was an improvement on the
previous year but still an unacceptable level. The 2007 results were similarly decreased with a 37% finding of
personal data.
In the following year the InfoWatch (2008) research enumerated the victims of information leakage into
commercial entities (50%), educational and non-governmental organizations (31%) and governmental bodies
(18%). When further quantified, it was revealed that 95% of the leakage could be classified as personal data with
portable storage accounting for most of these. The results were supported by Hoffman (2008) who found that
over 25% of employees admitted to storing sensitive data from there organization on portable storage devices.
Despite such findings the BERR (2008) survey detailed that over 67% of the companies in their study did
nothing to prevent confidential data being transported on unsecured USB sticks and other removable media. This
was followed again in 2009 with a survey which found that 52% of the disks contain organizational information,
51% personal information, and only 31% of the disks were wiped (Jones, 2009).
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WHY TARGET USB STORAGE
USB flash storage has gradually become synonymous with portable data storage since its commercial
introduction in 2000 (ENISA, 2008). A study conducted by Gartner (2005) enumerated the market for USB flash
drives in 2004 as $1.47 billion forecasts growth to reach $3.47 billion in 2010. This growth in sales has been
alongside an increase in the average capacity of these devices. According to Crisp (2009) the average capacity
of drives sold in 2005 was only 462.3MB which has grown to around 4.8GB in 2009.
The portability and low price point of these devices has not been accompanied by the use of appropriate
encryption. A 2007 study found that of the USB drives sold to corporate entities, as little as 10% claimed to
mandate the use of encryption to protect the data (Chapman, 2007). This is despite research which detailed that
over 77% of USB drives may be used by users at work and of these users only 21% demonstrated awareness of
information leakage threats (ENISA, 2008). This usage was further enumerated into the type of data stored on
USB devices as detailed in the figure below

Figure 1. Corporate Data on USB Keys (ENISA, 2008)
These worrying trends are compounded by the research conducted by the Ponemon Institute (2009) into
downsized employees. They found that over 59% of their sample reported keeping company data after leaving
employment. The type of data kept included email lists (65%), non-financial business information (45%), and
customer information including contact lists (39%). Of the respondents that admitted to removing data, 42%
utilised USB flash drives in the transfer. Despite this the research showed that 89% of companies in the study
failed to audit USB devices for data leakage even though a majority did not require the return of flash storage on
cessation of employment.

SAMPLE ACQUISITION AND METHOD
For the purposes of this research it was decided to target USB storage devices that were as widely available as
possible, thus the UK version of eBay website was used in the acquisition of the sample. Only USB flash drives
that were clearly marked by the seller as used were purchased and efforts were undertaken to ensure that each
purchase was from a different seller and that no identifying features were present on the device. A range of
capacities were purchased and are enumerated in the table below:

Size
Number of
devices

128Mb

256Mb

512Mb

1Gb

2Gb

4Gb

2

1

4

8

3

2

Table 1. Capacity of USB Drives used in sample
Upon receipt of the devices, each was handled in accordance with correct forensic procedures. Once imaged the
analysis was conducted using the following software:
x

Encase 5

x

Forensic Tool Kit 1.81.3.
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x

Recuva

x

Zero Assumption Image Recovery

Every image within the study was subjected to a full range of recovery procedures as afforded by the
aforementioned software packages.

RESULTS
In all 36,136 files were recovered from the secondhand USB devices. As detailed in the figure below the
majority of files were Microsoft Word Documents, followed by images, then emails/html files.
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Figure 2 Total Files Recovered
Post recovery the files were investigated and classified according to type individual or corporate. Individual files
where determined to be any file that could not be identified as belonging or related to a business. Files were then
further separated into the likely sensitivity of the information between high and low sensitivity. This data is
enumerated in the following table. The four USB key devices that were determined to be empty, contained no
recoverable files or folders and were also free of data within their unallocated clusters.

Category

Number of Keys

Percentage

Empty

4

20%

Individual

Corporate

Low
Sensitivity
High
Sensitivity
Low
Sensitivity
High
Sensitivity

11
14

55%
70%

14

70%

2
6

10%
30%

6

30%

Table 2. Breakdown of Information Types Discovered
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Of the keys that were categorized as containing individual data over 92% contained enough information to
identify the owner of the USB storage device prior to sale. The extent of this information is illustrated in the
figure 3. It is noteworthy that the inclusion of mothers maiden name and the date of birth would be significant in
the likelihood of identity theft should the information be gathered for nefarious purposes. In addition to the
personal identification a range of the devices contained banking and/or login information of the previous owner
as detailed in figure 4.
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Figure 3. Type of Personal Identifier
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Figure 4. Percentage of Devices Containing Bank or Login Details
In addition to the above findings, 15% of the devices contained the CV of either the owner or a third party. When
this statistic is expanded to include keys that contained personal details of any third party this number increased
significantly to 60%. These details included full names, passport details and third party banking information. Of
the devices containing corporate data, there were found company logos, form letter templates, meeting notes,
financial reports, list of board members along with their personal information, turnover analysis, sales forecasts,
signature scans and companies’ bank details. Such information would allow direct targeting of these companies
for a range of fraudulent activities.
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With the cataloguing of this information it was possible to delineate the type of threats that might be carried out
against either the owners or the included third parties. The identified data (detailed in the table below) would
facilitate over 32 criminal acts including direct removal of funds from an identified individuals account.

Threats

Identity
Theft

Fraud

Industrial
Espionage

Blackmail

Hacking /
Network
Intrusion

Robbery

Number of
devices

11

9

2

5

4

1

Table 3. Direct Threats Possible from Included Data

CONCLUSION
When the findings of this research is viewed in the light of the previously discussed studies a worry trend
emerges. Whilst the breadth of collection is indicative of this work as a pilot study, the low rate (20%) of
securely wiped devices is lower than that found in the HDD based research. This may be attributable to the fact
that the previous studies were from corporate environments, whereas it is more likely that the sellers and
previous owners of these devices were individuals. The range and seriousness of the information leakage
represented by the data found on the devices was directly inline with other studies discussed.
Without exception every study of this type has documented findings of threats to both corporates and individuals
and this work is no exception. Of concern is that whilst the previous studies have typically dealt with corporate
disposals, in this study the sellers are exclusively private individuals. Thus whilst the corporate problem may be
reduced by awareness of liability and institutional education, it may be that the only viable solution to this sort of
leakage by individuals may be the banning of sales of second-hand storage devices. The scope of this problem is
barely known and definitely in need of further exploration. To this end similar studies are to be undertaken
worldwide to gain a true understanding of the true impact of second-hand USB storage disposal.
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